Bill C-14: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the National Defence Act (bail and sentencing)

Tabled in the House of Commons, December 3, 2025

Explanatory Note

Section 4.2 of the Department of Justice Act requires the Minister of Justice to prepare a Charter Statement for every government bill to help inform public and Parliamentary debate on government bills. One of the Minister of Justice’s most important responsibilities is to examine legislation for inconsistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [“the Charter”]. By tabling a Charter Statement, the Minister is sharing some of the key considerations that informed the review of a bill for inconsistency with the Charter. A Statement identifies Charter rights and freedoms that may potentially be engaged by a bill and provides a brief explanation of the nature of any engagement, in light of the measures being proposed.

A Charter Statement also identifies potential justifications for any limits a bill may impose on Charter rights and freedoms. Section 1 of the Charter provides that rights and freedoms may be subject to reasonable limits if those limits are prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This means that Parliament may enact laws that limit Charter rights and freedoms. The Charter will be violated only where a limit is not demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

A Charter Statement is intended to provide legal information to the public and Parliament on a bill’s potential effects on rights and freedoms that are neither trivial nor too speculative. It is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all conceivable Charter considerations. Additional considerations relevant to the constitutionality of a bill may also arise in the course of Parliamentary study and amendment of a bill. A Statement is not a legal opinion on the constitutionality of a bill.

Charter Considerations

The Minister of Justice has examined Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the National Defence Act (bail and sentencing), for any inconsistency with the Charter pursuant to his obligation under section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act. This review involved consideration of the objectives and features of the bill.

What follows is a non-exhaustive discussion of the ways in which Bill C-14 potentially engages the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. It is presented to assist in informing the public and Parliamentary debate on the bill. It does not include an exhaustive description of the entire bill, but rather focuses on those elements relevant for the purposes of a Charter Statement.

The main Charter-protected rights and freedoms potentially engaged by the proposed measures include:

• Freedom of expression (section 2(b)): Section 2(b) of the Charter provides that everyone has freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, and includes freedom of the press and other media of communication. Section 2(b) has been broadly interpreted as encompassing any activity or communication, aside from violence or threats of violence, which conveys or attempts to convey meaning.
• Right to liberty (section 7): Section 7 of the Charter protects against the deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty and security of the person unless done in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. These include the principles against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. An arbitrary law is one that impacts section 7 rights in a way that is not rationally connected to the law’s purpose. An overbroad law is one that impacts section 7 rights in a way that, while generally rational, goes too far by capturing some conduct that bears no relation to the law’s purpose. A grossly disproportionate law is one whose effects on section 7 rights are so severe as to be “completely out of sync” with the law’s purpose. Offences that carry the possibility of imprisonment have the potential to deprive liberty and so must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.
• Right against unreasonable search or seizure (section 8): Section 8 of the Charter protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The purpose of section 8 is to protect individuals against unreasonable intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy. A search or seizure that intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy will be reasonable if it is authorized by a law, the law itself is reasonable (in the sense of striking an appropriate balance between privacy interests and the state interest being pursued), and it is carried out in a reasonable manner. The assessment of the reasonableness of the law is a flexible one that takes into account the nature and purpose of the legislative scheme, and the nature of the affected privacy interests.
• Right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause (section 11(e)): Section 11(e) of the Charter guarantees that any person charged with an offence has the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Section 11(e) enshrines a basic entitlement to pre-trial release for accused persons, rooted in the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty. The terms and conditions of such release must be “reasonable” in the circumstances. The right to bail can only be denied with “just cause”. There is “just cause” to deny bail if two requirements are met: first, the denial of bail must occur only in a narrow set of circumstances; and second, the denial must be necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system and not be undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail system. 

Bail Reverse Onuses

The Bill would enact new reverse onuses at bail that would apply to accused persons charged with certain serious offences, would re-enact certain existing reverse onuses as part of an amendment to make an editorial correction, and would clarify that accused persons subject to a reverse onus should demonstrate how their release plan addresses the risk they pose. A reverse onus is a departure from the usual rule in bail proceedings that the burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate that there is just cause to detain the accused person pending trial. The three reasons for pre-trial detention are: to ensure the appearance of the accused in court when required, to protect the safety of the public, and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. When there is a reverse onus, the presumption is that the accused person will be detained while awaiting their trial, unless they can demonstrate to the court that they should be released by showing that there is no just cause for their detention. The additional offences to which a reverse onus would apply include human trafficking and human smuggling, violent and organized crime-related auto theft, break and enter of a dwelling house, extortion involving violence, and assault or sexual assault involving choking, suffocation or strangulation. The existing reverse onus for accused persons who have a relevant prior conviction within the last 5 years would be expanded to 10 years. As well, existing reverse onuses for certain offences under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act would be re-enacted to make an editorial correction. Provisions establishing a reverse onus for bail can engage section 11(e) because they have the potential to result in a denial of bail for an accused person.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with the Charter. The reverse onuses would result in a targeted restriction on the entitlement to bail under specific and narrow circumstances, rather than an absolute denial of release. They could result in a denial of bail for those accused persons who fail to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the three statutory grounds for pre-trial detention do not apply in their case. Further, the reverse onuses are tailored to persons accused of committing serious offences involving violence or potential violence, organized crime and/or exploitation. Persons accused of these offences may be presumed to be more likely to pose a risk to public safety if released on bail, and their release may reasonably be expected to undermine confidence in the administration of justice. For these categories of accused persons, reversing the usual presumption in favour of release advances the purposes and objectives of the bail system, including the protection of public safety and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice. Finally, specifying that persons accused of these offences demonstrate how their release plan addresses the risk they pose clarifies and supports the risk management purposes of the bail system.

Bail Conditions

The Bill would amend provisions which direct when a justice must consider including specific conditions in a release order. The Criminal Code requires that a justice impose a firearms/weapons prohibition order on an accused person released on bail who is charged with a listed offence, unless the justice considers that such conditions are not required for the safety of any person. The Criminal Code also requires that a justice must consider whether release of an accused person who is charged with a listed offence should include conditions such as abstaining from communicating with a victim, witness or other identified person, abstaining from going to any place or entering any geographic area, and wearing an electronic monitoring device if the Attorney General makes the request. The Bill would add extortion and any organized crime-related offence to these lists of offences. For accused persons charged with extortion, auto theft, or an offence alleged to have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization, the Bill would also add a provision requiring a justice to consider imposing certain listed conditions including abstaining from going to any place or entering any geographic area, abstaining from possession of instruments suitable for the purpose of breaking into any place or vehicle, or a curfew.

Requiring a justice to consider imposing conditions for additional offences may lead to more conditions being imposed, some of which may restrict a person’s liberty of movement (such as the condition to abstain from going to specific places). The proposed amendments have the potential to engage the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under section 11(e) and the right to liberty under section 7. The ability to impose a condition prohibiting a person from communicating with certain people has the potential to engage the freedom of expression under section 2(b). In addition, the ability to impose a condition requiring a person to wear an electronic monitoring device has the potential to engage the protection against unreasonable search or seizure under section 8.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with the provisions of the Charter that are potentially engaged. The current scheme under the Criminal Code would require a justice to consider whether it is required in the interests of the safety and security of any person (such as a victim of or witness to an offence) to add certain conditions to an accused person’s release order in each individual case. This means the imposition of specific bail conditions is not mandatory but rather, subject to judicial discretion. This safeguard supports the reasonableness of the bail conditions. Further, the release order may be varied where the accused, prosecutor and any sureties give written consent. In addition, the accused may, at any time before the trial of the charge, apply to a judge for a review of the release order including the conditions of release.

Grounds of Detention

The Bill would add specific circumstances when considering whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, a statutory ground for detention. Presently, this provision specifies circumstances including the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, the gravity of the offence, circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence including whether a firearm was used, and the possibility of a lengthy term of imprisonment on conviction. The Bill would add specific consideration of the number or gravity of any outstanding charges against the accused person arising from separate events. Because the amendment affects one of the grounds upon which an accused person may be denied bail, it has the potential to engage section 11(e).

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with the Charter. The amendments would not expand the scope of the ground for detention, but would merely highlight certain circumstances that should be considered by the justice having regard to all the circumstances. The listed circumstances are rationally connected to the maintenance of confidence in the administration of justice. The listed circumstances would only capture accused persons for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have already acted contrary to the trust inherent in their prior release on bail and contrary to the purposes of the bail system.

Bail after Guilty Verdict

If an accused person has been released from custody before trial, a prosecutor may apply to vacate, i.e. cancel, the release order after a finding of guilt. The Bill would amend subsection 523(2) of the Criminal Code to apply a reverse onus when a prosecutor applies to do so. This would require the accused person who has been found guilty to demonstrate why their detention while they await their sentencing is not justified.

Although the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under section 11(e) does not apply after a finding of guilt, this amendment still has the potential to engage the right to liberty under section 7.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with the Charter. A reverse onus in these circumstances would arise after a finding of guilt, meaning that there is no longer a presumption of innocence. Further, as with bail reverse onuses before trial, this provision does not create an absolute denial of release and would result in a detention only where an accused person fails to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the three statutory grounds for detention do not apply to them. Since this would only apply to persons who have been found guilty, reversing the usual presumption in favour of release advances the purposes and objectives of the bail system including the protection of public safety and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice.

Availability of Conditional Sentences

Conditional sentence orders are designed to allow offenders to serve their sentences in the community under strict conditions, rather than in custody. Conditional sentence orders generally require confinement to residence and a curfew, and may include other conditions such as treatment, and/or restrictions on owning/possessing/carrying a weapon. In order for a conditional sentence to be imposed, several requirements set out in section 742.1 of the Criminal Code must be met: (1) that the court is satisfied that a conditional sentence is consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing and would not endanger the safety of the community, (2) that the offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than two years. Notwithstanding these general rules, the Criminal Code also limits the availability of conditional sentences for certain types of offences, including offences punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, the offences of advocating genocide, torture and attempted murder, and terrorism and criminal organization offences that are prosecuted by way of indictment and for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more.

The proposed amendments would make conditional sentences unavailable for sexual assault offences and offences that are of a sexual nature or committed for a sexual purpose in cases involving a victim under 18 years of age, prosecuted by indictment.

Because the amendments would create new restrictions on the availability of conditional sentences, they have the potential to deprive liberty and so must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.

The following considerations support the consistency of the limited new restrictions on the availability of conditional sentences with section 7. Limitations on the availability of conditional sentences aim to enhance consistency in the conditional sentencing regime by making imprisonment the typical punishment for certain serious offences. The amendments in this Bill are tailored to prohibit conditional sentences for only specific serious offences when prosecuted by indictment: for sexual assault offences involving any victim and offences, that are of a sexual nature or committed for a sexual purpose in cases involving a victim under 18 years of age. The amendments do not otherwise limit judicial discretion to impose a sentence that is fit and proportionate in the circumstances.

Consecutive sentences

Amendments would provide that sentences for the offence of auto theft committed with violence or at the direction of a criminal organization be served consecutively to any sentence for breaking and entering arising out of the same series of events, that sentences for second or subsequent auto theft with violence or at the direction of a criminal organization be served consecutively to any other sentence for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events, and that sentences for extortion be served consecutively to any sentence for arson arising out of the same event or series of events. As these provisions affect sentencing, they have potential effects on the right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with section 7. While the amendments would provide guidance on sentencing, they would not interfere with a sentencing court's ability to impose a fit and proportionate penalty in the circumstances. Courts would continue to be bound by the totality principle at paragraph 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code, which provides that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.

Youth Criminal Justice Act

The Bill would amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act to clarify when a youth sentence is suspended after an alleged breach of conditions in a conditional supervision order or deferred custody and supervision order and to make explicit that conditions already contained in a conditional supervision or deferred custody order continue to apply during a suspension or while the young person awaits determination of the alleged breach of conditions by the youth justice court. Currently, the Youth Criminal Justice Act deems a youth sentence to be suspended during the period between the issuance of a warrant for breach and the young person’s apprehension, i.e. the period of time the young person is unlawfully at large. The amendments would clarify that a sentence resumes running when the young person is no longer unlawfully at large, while they await determination of the alleged breach by the youth justice court. The amendments would also ensure that a young person is required to abide by all prior conditions, including any that were the subject of the alleged breach, if released after a bail hearing or if remanded in custody (as applicable). Because these amendments could affect the restrictiveness or the end date of a youth sentence, they have the potential to engage the right to liberty under section 7.

The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with the Charter. The amendment regarding suspension during a period when a young person is unlawfully at large does not add to the duration of the sentence already imposed by the youth justice court. The continuation of prior conditions following a breach clarifies that the sentence already imposed by the youth justice court will have continuing effect. Any changes to a custody and supervision order, conditional supervision order, or deferred custody and supervision order would be made by a judge.

The Bill would also amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act to allow a police officer to publish identifying information about a youth if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the youth has committed or is likely to commit an indictable offence and is at large and the urgency of the situation requires such publication. Immediate publication would be permitted where it is necessary for the following reasons: the youth is an imminent danger to the public and the publication would aid in preventing serious bodily harm or death; the publication will assist in apprehending the young person; and a court order could not with reasonable diligence be obtained. The ability to publish information about a youth without a court order would potentially engage section 8 of the Charter. The Youth Criminal Justice Act prohibits the publication of any identifying information about a young person except in specified circumstances.

The following considerations support the consistency of this measure with section 8. The proposed power to publish identifying information would serve an important public safety purpose. Stringent conditions would govern the use of this authority, for example the police officer must reasonably believe that the situation is so urgent that a court order could not reasonably be obtained and must obtain such a court order if the publication is required for more than 24 hours.

National Defence Act

The bill would re-enact the offence of contempt at section 302 of the National Defence Act, as part of an amendment to increase the maximum sentence for that offence. Since the offence of contempt is punishable by imprisonment, it engages the right to liberty protected under section 7 of the Charter. As some of the acts that constitute the offence of contempt under section 302 are expressive, it also has the potential to engage freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The following considerations support the consistency of the offence with the Charter. The listed acts under section 302 target conduct that could interfere with the administration of military justice in a manner analogous to the common-law offence of contempt that applies in other court proceedings (for example, failing to attend when called as a witness, and interfering with proceedings), and are tailored to that pressing and substantial objective.