Bill C-9: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda, hate crime and access to religious or cultural places)

Tabled in the House of Commons, October 7, 2025

Explanatory Note

Section 4.2 of the Department of Justice Act requires the Minister of Justice to prepare a Charter Statement for every government bill to help inform public and Parliamentary debate on government bills. One of the Minister of Justice’s most important responsibilities is to examine legislation for inconsistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [“the Charter”]. By tabling a Charter Statement, the Minister is sharing some of the key considerations that informed the review of a bill for inconsistency with the Charter. A Statement identifies Charter rights and freedoms that may potentially be engaged by a bill and provides a brief explanation of the nature of any engagement, in light of the measures being proposed.

A Charter Statement also identifies potential justifications for any limits a bill may impose on Charter rights and freedoms. Section 1 of the Charter provides that rights and freedoms may be subject to reasonable limits if those limits are prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This means that Parliament may enact laws that limit Charter rights and freedoms. The Charter will be violated only where a limit is not demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

A Charter Statement is intended to provide legal information to the public and Parliament on a bill’s potential effects on rights and freedoms that are neither trivial nor too speculative. It is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all conceivable Charter considerations. Additional considerations relevant to the constitutionality of a bill may also arise in the course of Parliamentary study and amendment of a bill. A Statement is not a legal opinion on the constitutionality of a bill.

Charter Considerations

The Minister of Justice has examined Bill C-9, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda, hate crime and access to religious or cultural places), for any inconsistency with the Charter pursuant to his obligation under section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act. This review involved consideration of the objectives and features of the bill.

What follows is a non-exhaustive discussion of the ways in which Bill C-9 potentially engages the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. It is presented to assist in informing the public and Parliamentary debate on the bill. It does not include an exhaustive description of the entire bill, but rather focuses on those elements relevant for the purposes of a Charter Statement.

The main Charter-protected rights and freedoms potentially engaged by the proposed measures include:

• Freedom of religion (section 2(a)): Section 2(a) provides that everyone has freedom of conscience and religion. This guarantee protects a person’s sincerely held practices or beliefs that have a connection with religion. A law or government action that interferes with the ability to act in accordance with such practices or beliefs may engage section 2(a) if the interference is more than trivial or insubstantial.
  
• Freedom of expression (section 2(b)): Section 2(b) of the Charter provides that everyone has freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, and includes freedom of the press and other media of communication. Section 2(b) has been broadly interpreted as encompassing any activity or communication, aside from violence or threats of violence, which conveys or attempts to convey meaning.
• Freedom of peaceful assembly (section 2(c)): Section 2(c) provides that everyone has the freedom of peaceful assembly. This provision is closely related to freedom of expression and protects participation in peaceful demonstrations, protests, meetings, picketing and other assemblies.
• Right to liberty (section 7): Section 7 of the Charter protects against the deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty and security of the person unless done in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. These include the principles against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. An arbitrary law is one that impacts section 7 rights in a way that is not rationally connected to the law’s purpose. An overbroad law is one that impacts section 7 rights in a way that, while generally rational, goes too far by capturing some conduct that bears no relation to the law’s purpose. A grossly disproportionate law is one whose effects on section 7 rights are so severe as to be “completely out of sync” with the law’s purpose. Offences that carry the possibility of imprisonment have the potential to deprive liberty and so must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.
• Right against unreasonable search or seizure (section 8): Section 8 of the Charter protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The purpose of section 8 is to protect individuals against unreasonable intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy. A search or seizure that intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy will be reasonable if it is authorized by a law, the law itself is reasonable (in the sense of striking an appropriate balance between privacy interests and the state interest being pursued), and it is carried out in a reasonable manner. The assessment of the reasonableness of the law is a flexible one that takes into account the nature and purpose of the legislative scheme, and the nature of the affected privacy interests.
  
• Right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause (section 11(e)): Section 11(e) of the Charter guarantees that any person charged with an offence has the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Section 11(e) enshrines a basic entitlement to pre-trial release for accused persons, rooted in the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty. The terms and conditions of such release must be “reasonable” in the circumstances. The right to bail can only be denied with “just cause”.

Overview

Bill C-9 would amend the Criminal Code to propose new offences to better protect access to religious, cultural and other specified places, and to address hate-motivated crimes. The proposed amendments in the Bill would create four new criminal offences: (1) an intimidation offence that prohibits conduct that is intended to provoke a state of fear in another person to impede them from accessing religious or cultural institutions and other specified places; (2) an offence that prohibits the intentional obstruction of a person’s lawful access to such places; (3) a hate crime offence to more explicitly denounce hate-motivated crime; and (4) an offence that prohibits wilfully promoting hatred against any identifiable group by displaying, in any public place, certain hate or terrorist symbols. A definition of “hatred” would also be added to the Criminal Code to clarify the type of conduct captured by the new hate crime offence and existing hate propaganda offences. The Bill proposes other amendments to the Criminal Code, including adding some of the new proposed offences to the existing scheme governing the interception of private communications, forensic DNA analysis and making release orders (bail) with conditions.

New Intimidation and Obstruction Offences

Bill C-9 would amend the Criminal Code to create a new intimidation offence for conduct intended to provoke a state of fear in a person in order to impede their access to:

1. a building or structure, or part of a building or structure, that is primarily used for religious worship or by an “identifiable group” for administrative, social, cultural or sports activities or events, as an educational institution (including a daycare centre) or as a residence for seniors; or
2. a cemetery.

An “identifiable group” is defined in subsection 318(4) of the Criminal Code as a group distinguished by colour, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or mental or physical disability.

In addition, the Bill would create a new offence for intentionally obstructing or interfering with another person’s lawful access to the same places protected under the new intimidation offence. The obstruction offence would include a statutory exception so that it does not apply to people who are at or near the protected places for the sole purpose of obtaining or communicating information. The new intimidation and obstruction offences would be punishable by a maximum of 10 years imprisonment on indictment or two years less a day by summary proceeding.

Because the proposed intimidation and obstruction offences are punishable by imprisonment, they engage the right to liberty under section 7 and must be consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. The offences may also engage the freedom of expression under section 2(b) and freedom of peaceful assembly under section 2(c) by potentially prohibiting communications and assemblies that are protected under these rights.

The following considerations support the consistency of the proposed offences with sections 2(b), 2(c) and 7 of the Charter. The intimidation offence would include a specific intent requirement, which means there would have to be proof that a person intended to provoke a state of fear in another person in order to prevent them from accessing the particular property. Where this type of intimidating conduct could be equated to violence or threats of violence, the offence would not limit the freedom of expression or the freedom of peaceful assembly, which do not protect such violent acts. Meanwhile, the obstruction offence would include a statutory exception to prevent criminalizing people who are merely at or near a protected place for the sole purpose of obtaining or communicating information. Therefore, the proposed offences are constructed in such a way to avoid prohibiting peaceful protests or demonstrations.

Definition of “Hatred”

The Bill would create a definition of “hatred” for two of the existing hate propaganda offences in section 319 (publicly inciting hatred where it is likely to lead to a breach of the peace and wilfully promoting hatred), the new hate propaganda offence and for the new hate crime offence. The definition would specify that “hatred” involves detestation or vilification and does not mean disdain or dislike. The Bill further specifies that the communication of a statement does not incite or promote hatred solely because it discredits, humiliates, hurts or offends. This would codify decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The proposed definition of “hatred” has the potential to engage freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Charter. The following considerations support the consistency of the proposed amendment with section 2(b). The proposed definition reflects the way “hatred” has been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court articulated a definition of “hatred” in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott (2013) that characterizes the concept as connoting extreme manifestations of detestation or vilification, which go beyond mere dislike or causing humiliation or offence. The Supreme Court defined “hatred” in similar terms in R. v. Keegstra (1990), while considering the constitutionality of the offence of wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group in section 319 of the Criminal Code. The definition would focus on vilification and detestation, and it would also clarify what does not constitute hatred. The proposed amendment would thus codify a definition settled in the leading jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada.

New Hate Crime Offence

The Bill would create a new hate crime offence that would apply to the commission of any offence under the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament that is motivated by hatred based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression. The new offence would have an increasing penalty structure that would provide for higher maximum penalties depending on the maximum punishment for the underlying offence (the specific offence that was motivated by hatred based on the relevant factors described above). If prosecuted by way of summary conviction, the maximum punishment for the new hate crime offence would be two years less a day. If prosecuted by way of indictment, the maximum punishment would range from up to five years, 10 years, 14 years or life imprisonment.

Because the new hate crime offence is punishable by imprisonment, it engages the right to liberty under section 7 and must be consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. The Minister has not identified any inconsistencies with the principles of fundamental justice. The proposed hate crime offence is tailored to its objective of combatting crimes motivated by hatred, which would be clearly defined by the Bill. The scope of conduct covered by the offence is identical to that of the existing underlying offences. The increasing penalty structure for the new hate crime offence is also tailored to the seriousness of the underlying offence, and would not impact the discretion of sentencing judges to impose a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

New Hate Propaganda Offence

The Bill would create a new offence of wilfully promoting hatred against any identifiable group by displaying, in a public place, certain terrorism or hate symbols. The symbols are defined as:

1. a symbol that is principally used by or associated with a listed terrorist entity, as defined in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code;
2. the Nazi Hakenkreuz, also known as the Nazi swastika, the Nazi double-Sig-Rune, also known as the SS bolts; or
3. a symbol that so nearly resembles a symbol described in paragraph (a) or (b) that it is likely to be confused with that symbol.

An “identifiable group” is defined in subsection 318(4) of the Criminal Code as a group distinguished by colour, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or mental or physical disability.

The Bill would clarify that no person shall be convicted of this offence if the display of the symbol was for a legitimate purpose, including a legitimate purpose related to journalism, religion, education or art, that is not contrary to the public interest; or if, in good faith, the display of the symbol was intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group in Canada.

The Bill would provide that everyone who commits this offence is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

The proposed offence would limit freedom of expression under section 2(b), since the wilful promotion of hatred by display of symbols is expressive activity. The following considerations support the consistency of the proposed offence with section 2(b) of the Charter. The offence would include a specific intent requirement, which means there would have to be proof that a person displaying the symbol publicly did so for the purpose of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group. The mere public display of the symbol would not be an offence, nor would public display of the symbol for purposes other than to wilfully promote hatred. The set of defined symbols that are within the scope of the offence is delineated by criteria: symbols principally used by or associated with listed terrorist entities, certain Nazi symbols, and symbols very similar to them. The symbols are presumed to be harmful and to contribute little to the purposes of freedom of expression in contexts where they are used as hate propaganda. For greater clarity, the amendments would include two defences to reinforce the understanding that public display of symbols for legitimate purposes does not constitute the offence.

Interception of Private Communications and Forensic DNA Analysis

The Bill would add the new intimidation offence to the list of offences in section 183 of the Criminal Code, which allows investigators to seek judicial authorization to intercept private communications. In addition, the Bill would add the new intimidation offence to the definition of “secondary designated offence” in section 487.04 of the Criminal Code, which would permit the taking of bodily samples under the existing forensic DNA analysis regime.

The amendments to expand the range of offences for which private communications may be intercepted and for which bodily samples may be taken potentially engages the protection against unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter. The following considerations support the consistency of these amendments with section 8. The existing protections contained within the Criminal Code would continue to apply. This would include the requirement of obtaining judicial authorization before intercepting a private communication or to take bodily samples for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis, thus meeting the requirements under section 8 of the Charter for a search or seizure to be reasonable.

Specific Release Conditions for the New Intimidation Offence

The Bill would include the new intimidation offence in provisions requiring a justice to consider imposing specific conditions on an accused person’s release order (bail). These conditions are listed in subsections 515(4.1) and 515(4.2) of the Criminal Code and include: a prohibition on possessing firearms, abstaining from communicating with a victim, witness or other identified person, abstaining from going to any place or entering any geographic area and wearing an electronic monitoring device if the Attorney General makes the request.

Requiring the justice to consider imposing conditions for additional offences may lead to more conditions being imposed, some of which may restrict a person’s liberty of movement (such as the condition to abstain from going to specific places). The proposed amendments have the potential to engage the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under section 11(e) and the right to liberty under section 7. The ability to impose a condition prohibiting a person from communicating with certain people has the potential to engage the freedom of expression under section 2(b). In addition, the ability to impose a condition requiring a person to wear an electronic monitoring device has the potential to engage the protection against unreasonable search or seizure under section 8.

The following considerations support the consistency of the amendments with the provisions of the Charter that are potentially engaged. The current scheme under the Criminal Code would require a justice to consider whether it is in the interests of the safety and security of any person (such as a victim of or witness to an offence) to add certain conditions to an accused person’s release order in each individual case. As such, the imposition of specific bail conditions is not mandatory but rather, subject to judicial discretion. This safeguard supports the reasonableness of the bail conditions. Further, the release order may be varied where the accused, prosecutor and any sureties give written consent. In addition, the accused may, at any time before the trial of the charge, apply to a judge for a review of the release order including the conditions of release.