Section 3 – Democratic rights


3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

Similar provisions

There is no similar provision in the Canadian Bill of Rights. Similar provisions may be found in the following international instruments binding on Canada: article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and articles 20, 32 and 34 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

See also the following international, regional and comparative law instruments that are not legally binding on Canada but include similar provisions: article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. The American Constitution does not contain a separate guarantee of the right to vote, but some sections, and some Amendments (section 1, section 2, and the 15th, 19th, 24th and 26th Amendments) include various guarantees relating to the right to vote.


The purpose of section 3 is to protect the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process (Frank v. Canada, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraphs 26-27; Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 55, at paragraph 28; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, at paragraphs 25-26 and 30; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at paragraphs 69-70). Participation in the electoral process has an intrinsic value independent of its impact upon the actual outcome of elections (Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 29; Daoust v. Québec (Directeur général des élections), 2011 QCCA 1634, at paragraph 46, leave to appeal to SCC refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 490). Denial of the right to vote affects one’s dignity and sense of self-worth (Frank, supra, at paragraph 82); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, at paragraph 35 (“Sauvé No. 2”).

Supreme Court jurisprudence also indicates that section 3 protects the right to “effective representation” (Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (“Saskatchewan Reference”) at 183; Harper, supra, at paragraph 68).This right includes the idea of having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the right to bring one’s grievances and concerns to the attention of one’s government representative (Saskatchewan Reference, supra, at 183).

Section 3 must be interpreted having regard to the philosophical principles that have guided the historic development of the right to vote in our constitutional tradition (Saskatchewan Reference, supra). It must also be interpreted in a way that advances the values and principles that embody a free and democratic society, which include respect for a diversity of opinions and beliefs (Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 27; Saskatchewan Reference, supra, at 188-189).

In interpreting section 3, its broad ambit should not be limited by countervailing collective concerns, such as fairness to Canadian residents or the public interest in aggregating political preferences; these are more appropriately considered under section 1 (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 28-32, 61; Figueroa, supra, at paragraphs 31-37; Sauvé No. 2, supra, at paragraph 11; Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876, at paragraphs 29-31).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that section 3 does not protect the right of each citizen to play an unlimited role in the electoral process. The mere fact that legislation departs from absolute voter equality or restricts the capacity of a citizen to participate in the electoral process is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that it interferes with the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. But if the legislation does, in fact, interfere with the capacity of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process, it is inconsistent with section 3 (Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 36).

The importance of section 3, and the need to give it a large and liberal interpretation, are underlined by the fact that section 3 is not subject to constitutional override under section 33 of the Charter (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 25; 32; Sauvé No. 2, supra, at paragraph 11; Opitz, supra, at paragraph 29).


1. Application

Section 3 is one of the few rights in the Charter that is reserved to Canadian citizens.

Section 3 applies to elections of the House of Commons and provincial and territorial legislative bodies (on this point, see section 30 of the Charter). It does not apply to a referendum (Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995), municipal elections (Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34, at paragraph 45; Haig, supra; Rheaume v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 22 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused [1992] S.C.C.A. No. 146; Nunziata v. Toronto (City) Clerk (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 295 (Ont.C.A.)) or elections to an Indian band council (Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203).

The courts have recognized the interrelationship between section 3 and other Charter rights, particularly the rights to freedom of expression and equality (Figueroa, supra). Even when section 3 does not apply, the values of democratic participation embodied in that section may still be argued as the basis of an application under freedom of expression in section 2(b) and freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter (see e.g., Haig, supra; Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6 and Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, involving referenda; Baier v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673, involving school board elections; B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2017] 1 S.C.R. 93, involving sponsorship of election advertising) or the right to equality in section 15 of the Charter (e.g., Corbiere, supra; Baier, supra). While rights can overlap, section 2(b) and section 3 are distinct rights to be given independent meaning (Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), supra, at paragraph 45; Harper, supra, at paragraph 67; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at paragraphs 79-80). The right to effective representation, which is at the core of section 3, is not a principle of s. 2(b), and cannot be imported wholesale into s. 2(b) (Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), supra, at paragraph 45).

2. Direct interference with the right to vote or to be a candidate

(i) The vote

It is a restriction of section 3 to expressly deprive certain citizens of the right to vote, including:

Note that residence requirements with respect to provincial/territorial elections were distinguished in Frank, supra, which concerned a federal election. Generally speaking, it may be easier to justify provincial residence requirements as a reasonable limit on the right to vote (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 61, 91).

The imposition of administrative requirements on qualified electors in order to be entitled to vote, such as the requirement to produce proof of one’s identity and residence at the polling station before casting a ballot, may also prima facie restrict the right to vote (Henry v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 BCSC 610, aff’d 2014 BCCA 30, leave to appeal to SCC refused [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 134 — although this particular requirement was justified under section 1).

A failure on the part of governments to take positive action to put in place appropriate mechanisms to enable citizens to exercise their right to vote (for example, absentee ballots) may also restrict section 3 (Re Hoogbruin and Attorney General of British Columbia (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 718 (B.C.C.A.); Henry v. Canada (Attorney General) supra).

A decision by the Chief Electoral Officer on whether to recommend a change to a fixed federal election date because it coincides with a Jewish holiday must appropriately consider section 3 rights (Aryeh-Bain v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 964, at paragraph 56).

(ii) Eligibility to be a candidate

The words “to be qualified for membership” in section 3 should be interpreted broadly to mean that every citizen is eligible to be a candidate and sit in the House of Commons or a legislative assembly (Harvey, supra at paragraphs 27-29).

A statutory restriction on eligibility to be a candidate is generally a limit of section 3 (Harvey, supra). This includes:

However, some restrictions have been found not to offend section 3, e.g.:

3. Interference with the conditions under which section 3 rights are exercised

Even where the right to vote or eligibility to be a candidate is not directly denied, there may be a restriction of section 3 where the impugned law or government action interferes with the conditions under which these rights are exercised. In such cases, notably those involving the distribution of electoral boundaries, it may be necessary to consider the broader social and political context in order to determine whether the challenged measure infringes the right to play a meaningful role in the electoral process or the right to effective representation (Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 33).

(i) The distribution of electoral boundaries

The right to effective representation may be infringed where the effect of how the electoral map is drawn is to assign considerably more weight to one vote than to another (Saskatchewan Reference, supra; Reference re Electoral Divisions Statutes Amendment Act, 1993, [1994] A.J. No. 768 (Alta.C.A.) (QL); Reference re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Alberta) (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 447 (Alta.C.A.); Charlottetown (City) v. Prince Edward Island (1998), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (P.E.I.S.C.A.D.), leave to appeal to SCC refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 64).

Section 3 does not guarantee absolute equality of voting power as between citizens. However, relative equality of voting power is of prime importance under section 3 and a first condition of effective representation (Saskatchewan Reference, supra, at 183; Reference re Electoral Divisions Statutes Amendment Act, 1993 (Alta.C.A.), supra, at paragraphs 43-45 and 56; Charlottetown (P.E.I.S.C.A.D.), supra, at paragraphs 18-20). Other factors may also be considered in drawing electoral boundaries to ensure legislatures effectively represent the diversity of Canadian society, including geography, community history, community interests and minority representation (Saskatchewan Reference, supra, at 184-185; Reference re House of Assembly Act (N.S.), 2017 NSCA 10, at paragraphs 66-68).

For example, in the Saskatchewan Reference, supra, the Supreme Court found that the variances in voter population between urban and rural ridings in that case were justified based on such considerations as the special challenges of representing sparsely populated rural ridings, geographic boundaries such as rivers and municipal boundaries that form natural community dividing lines, and growth projections.

Most jurisdictions in Canada establish independent commissions that are involved in reviewing and determining how electoral boundaries should be distributed. Section 3 does not require that independent boundaries commissions be involved (Saskatchewan Reference, supra; Reference re Electoral Divisions Statutes Amendment Act, 1993, supra, at paragraph 79; Charlottetown (PEISCAD), supra, at paragraph 32). But the process for drawing boundaries should be fair (Saskatchewan Reference, supra, at paragraph 76). In addition, whichever body is tasked with drawing boundaries must be permitted to balance voter parity against the other applicable factors to ensure the boundaries reflect effective representation (Reference re House of Assembly Act (N.S.), supra, at paragraphs 90, 108 and 134).

(ii) The differential treatment of electoral competitors

Section 3 does not require governments to treat all citizens and all electoral competitors in exactly the same way (Figueroa, supra, at paragraphs 51 and 91). However, section 3 does oblige governments not to enhance the capacity of one citizen to participate in the electoral process in a way that compromises another citizen’s parallel right to do the same (Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 50). The differential treatment of electoral competitors may limit section 3 where it is found to exacerbate a pre-existing disparity in their capacity to communicate their ideas and position to voters (Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 54; see also Longley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 852, leave to SCC refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 41, with respect to political parties).

For example, a legislative requirement for political parties to endorse at least 50 candidates in an election in order to obtain access to financial and other benefits (the ability to issue tax receipts, transfer unspent election funds to one’s party and include one’s party affiliation on the ballot) was found to interfere with section 3, as it exacerbated the pre-existing disparity in the capacity of small, emerging and fringe parties to compete for votes with larger, established parties (Figueroa, supra).

The leader of the governing party’s decision to call an election before the fixed election date set out in legislation does not limit section 3 rights, as there was no evidence that it led to an unfair election, or that it had an adverse effect on other political parties (Conacher v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 920, at paragraph 76, 2010 FCA 131, at paragraph 11, leave to appeal to SCC refused [2010] S.C.C.A. 315).

(iii) Electoral System

The Constitution does not require a particular kind of electoral system (Daoust, supra, at paragraph 36; see also Figueroa, supra at paragraphs 81 and 161). In Daoust, it was argued that the “first-past-the-post” or single member plurality system of voting, currently used throughout Canada, interferes with section 3 because it produces results that distort the vote, and favours the election of majority governments over smaller parties. The Quebec Court of Appeal accepted that every electoral system, including systems based on proportional representation, have shortcomings and lead to some deviation or distortion in the results that they produce. The first-past-the post system was found to respect the principle of relative voter parity, and not to limit the principle of effective representation in section 3.

(iv) Electoral information

Section 3 includes a citizen’s right to exercise his or her vote in an informed manner (Harper, supra, at paragraph 71). A measure that denies electors sufficient information to enable them to make an informed choice in voting may compromise the right to vote guaranteed by section 3 (Thomson Newspapers, supra, at paragraphs 82-84; Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) (1995), 123 D.L.R. (4th) 366 (Alta.C.A.), at 424-426).

However, section 3 does not include a right to unlimited information. Otherwise, groups with more resources could monopolize the political discourse, and this unequal dissemination of points of view during election campaigns may undermine a voter’s ability to be adequately informed of all views. Carefully tailored spending limits on election advertising have been found to promote equality in political discourse, and do not interfere with section 3 (Harper, supra, at paragraphs 72-74 — although such limits may well restrict freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter).

4. Conflict with the exercise of a Parliamentary privilege

Where the infringement of the right to vote or eligibility to be a candidate results from the exercise of a Parliamentary privilege, the infringement may fall outside the jurisdiction of the courts to review (Harvey, supra).

5. Interpreting elections legislation

Legislation regulating elections, such as the Canada Elections Act, should be interpreted wherever possible in a way that is enfranchising (Opitz, supra, at paragraph 37; Haig, supra, at 1049-50).

Enfranchisement and protecting the integrity of the democratic process are central purposes of the Canada Elections Act (Frank, supra, at paragraph 11; Opitz, supra, at paragraph 38; see also paragraph 145 per the dissent, which states the Act’s overarching purpose is “to ensure the democratic legitimacy of federal elections in Canada”).

While residence is an important organizational mechanism for the purposes of the right to vote, residence is not an essential or implicit requirement of the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 28-32, 61).

The interrelated and sometimes conflicting values which Canada’s electoral system must balance include “certainty, accuracy, fairness, accessibility, voter anonymity, promptness, finality, legitimacy, efficiency and cost”, with the central value being the Charter right to vote (Opitz, supra, at paragraph 44).

6. Interlocutory injunctions and stays

There is a growing body of cases in which the courts have considered whether to issue an interlocutory injunction in a Charter challenge to elections legislation. Most have invoked section 3 of the Charter, but some have also involved section 2. These are motions brought by claimants to suspend the effect of an elections law pending the court’s disposition of the case, in circumstances where the merits cannot be determined in time before an upcoming election. The courts have generally found for the claimant on the first two parts of the test for an injunction (that there is a serious issue to be tried, and that there will be irreparable harm to democratic rights if the injunction is not granted). However, these motions have largely been unsuccessful on the third part of the test (the balance of convenience). Governments benefit at this stage of the test from a presumption that a validly enacted law will produce a public good. In addition, the courts have adopted a rule against granting the equivalent of final relief in interlocutory challenges to elections legislation (see Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R 764).

A related line of cases deals with motions brought by governments to stay the effect of a court judgment striking down elections legislation as contrary to the Charter, pending the disposition of an appeal. The results in these cases have been mixed, with the government’s request for a stay being granted in some cases (Longley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 149), while not being granted in others (Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 485; Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1997] 3 F.C. 628 (T.D.), [1997] 3 F.C. 643 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 264).

Section 1 considerations specific to this section

In the case of a direct interference with the right to vote or stand as a candidate, the Charter analysis will in most cases focus on section 1. Where the complaint alleges interference with the conditions under which section 3 rights are exercised, the section 3 analysis may be more extensive, especially in the case of electoral boundaries, and may involve consideration of the broader social context (Saskatchewan Reference, supra; Figueroa, supra).

The importance of the right to vote, which is reflected, for instance, by the fact that section 3 is not subject to override under section 33, calls for rigorous application of section 1 requirements, not judicial deference (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 1, 25, 43-44; Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 60; Sauvé No. 2, supra at paragraphs 9, 11 and 14; Sauvé No. 1 (Ont.C.A.), supra; Henry (BCCA), supra at paragraphs 84-85; see also Opitz, supra, at paragraph 35). Deference is not appropriate when dealing with an absolute prohibition on a core democratic right (Frank, supra, at paragraph 43).

In contrast, deference may be appropriate in the case of a complex regulatory response or a decision involving competing social and political policies (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 43-44). For instance, the legislature has been accorded deference under section 1 in choosing or designing Canada’s electoral model — e.g., in cases involving section 2(b) freedom of expression rather than section 3, as in Harper, supra; R v. Bryan, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527; and B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association, supra.

Evidence of a scientific nature may not always be required to justify limits on section 3 rights. In some cases, logic and common sense may largely be relied upon at the justification stage, without the need for rigorous social science evidence (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 59, 64; Harper, supra, Bryan, supra, and B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association, supra). That said, there must be some evidence of the harm that the restrictions on section 3 rights are meant to address. The benefits of denying long-term non-residents the right to vote in a federal election were found not to be based on concrete evidence or principled logic (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 63-64, 78, 82).

Vague, symbolic and abstract objectives for restricting section 3 rights will be more difficult to justify under section 1 (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 49-54; Sauvé No. 2, supra, at paragraphs 22-24). For instance, “preserving the social contract” between the electors and the elected to justify residence requirements in a federal election was not found to be a pressing and substantial objective capable of infringing section 3 of the Charter (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 49-53). On the other hand, the objective of maintaining and enhancing the integrity of the electoral process has been recognized as a pressing and substantial objective for limiting section 3 rights (Harvey, supra, at paragraph 38; Figueroa, supra, at paragraph 72). As has the objective of maintaining the fairness of the electoral system to resident Canadians (Frank, supra, at paragraphs 55-57).

The content is current up until 2022-07-31.